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ABSTRACT:  We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. 
economic history, geography, natural resources, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in 
federations. When the outcome of federal policies { such as transfer schemes, market regulation, 
migration targets { depends on these fundamentals, the set of regions that benefits or loses from 
such a policy is fixed exogenously (for each given policy). This creates a strategic incentive for 
the median voter to elect extremely protective federal representatives, who will distort 
redistribution in favour of their constituency by influencing the choice of the policy magnitude. 
Interestingly, the benefits of selecting tough negotiators outweigh those of belonging to the 
ruling coalition. We test our predictions by looking at parties' performances at national and 
European Parliament elections from 1990 onwards, and  find that strategic voting is indeed U-
shaped: winning and losing member states vote more extremely than those in the middle. Our 
online survey provides further evidence. 
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1 Introduction
A federal, or multi-level system of government, is an effective way to manage complex and
diverse societies: it can optimise scale advantages, minimise coordination failures and foster
innovative policy solutions (Boadway and Shah, 2009). However, it has not been immune
to the kind of political instability which has increasingly put democratic institutions under
pressure over the last decade. Polarisation and extremism are on the rise in the EU, the US,
but also Brazil or India. In general, explanations for this trend have mostly focused on the
economic and cultural insecurity of voters. If voters start feeling insecure, they will demand
more short-term protection.1 Now, even though sources of insecurity are certainly important
drivers here, we will argue that more strategic motives may be at play as well, especially in
a federal context.
We look for these strategic motives in the specific way a federal, or multi-level system of
government is set up, and this for two reasons. First, voters have to cast their vote for different
levels of government, which gives them more options to pick their battles strategically. Second,
lower-level voting districts (henceforth, regions) are inevitably affected by nationwide policies
introduced by the higher (federal) level. This gives voters good reason to think strategically
to begin with, because the regional heterogeneity in underlying fundamentals is often brought
to the surface by a salient federal policy. In other words, higher-level policies often imply a
structural redistribution of costs and benefits across regions, if only in voters’ minds, which
they may want to push in their favour.
Our theoretical model explains why voters indeed have the strategic incentive to elect what
we will call “extremely protectionist” politicians: to defend their regional interests in federal
negotiations. They do so even when electing such a tough negotiator comes at an ideological
cost, or increases the risk of not being included in the ruling coalition. Whether they believe
their region is winning or losing from the federal policy also does not matter. Both elements
set our model apart from previous work. We validate our results comparing the national
electoral outcomes with results for European Parliamentary elections, and run a survey that
shows that the theoretical channel we suggest is partially observable in voters’ behaviour. A
possible policy recommendation to reduce the welfare losses from extreme voting could then
be to cut the regional ties of the federal legislature altogether, for example by introducing a
union-wide electoral district, direct democracy or presidentialism.2
The fact that some regions will always gain from certain higher-level policies whilst oth-
ers lose out, is true in many different contexts. If migrant workers partially finance public
1The reasons can range from economic shocks, to migration flows, austerity policies or automation. We
discuss the relevant, and rapidly growing literature at length below.
2Stojanović and Bonotti (2019) discuss these institutional reforms at length in the EU context.
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provision, for example, attractive regions with high inflows will be ‘winners’ of any federal
policy organising free circulation of workers, whilst regions marked by outward-migration
will be ‘losers’. The same goes for an intergovernmental fiscal transfer scheme or a regional
fiscal rule, if the federal level decides on its generosity. Regions which are historically lagging
in economic terms, and hence more in need of financial support, will be the ‘winners’ of a
generous transfer scheme or a lax fiscal rule. What is crucial in both cases, is that the under-
lying reasons why certain regions are (seen as) winners or losers from a given federal policy
are highly persistent, and will at most only change in the long run. In the example given
above, these fundamentals were economic and geographical, and hence would apply to any of
the ‘left-behind’ rust belt areas as opposed to urban agglomerations, but they could also be
related to regionally concentrated natural resources or other endowed amenities.3
One key innovation of our model is that this regional heterogeneity of underlying funda-
mentals directly maps into the impact of a federal policy: a region either benefits or loses,
possibly to different degrees. This drastically changes bargaining and coalition formation
at the federal level, and in turn voting behaviour as well. Indeed, when the set of winners
and losers from a given federal policy is exogenous (or, at least, perceived to be so), federal
negotiations on the policy are entirely centred on its magnitude. Setting the size of the pie is
what matters most, so to speak, instead of deciding how it is shared. Because of this, voters
no longer need to maximise their chances of being included in the ruling federal coalition
by electing a milder, more accommodating representative. Even if there were no chance of
being included in the coalition, it would still be rational to elect extremely protectionist del-
egates. If they are selected by the formateur to become part of the coalition, far the better.
If they are not, others with the same objectives will be selected, which neutralises the risk of
expropriation.
Both in ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ regions, the median voter thus has an incentive to elect
federal representatives that are extremely protective of their own region’s interests. They
do so to stake out a stronger bargaining position at the higher level, to make sure the other
regions do not disproportionally gain from negotiations shaping the federal policy. In that
sense neither the winning nor the losing regions gain much and are trapped in a kind of
prisoner’s dilemma: they keep each other in check once inside the coalition, serving as each
other’s counterweight. For ‘winning’ regions this comes in the form of more pronounced
3There are many other situations in which the set of regions belonging to the ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ group
is perceived as sticky. Aside from geography and (economic) history, such beliefs could also follow from a
complex set of national laws and regulations, social capital endowments, or institutional drift. These are all
factors which are very hard to change even in the medium run. For example, federal regulation aimed at
promoting pro-civic or social behaviour comes at the cost of restricting individual freedoms, and also has high
enforcement costs. The level of social capital of a region then implies that the regulation may be beneficial or
just costly and redundant.
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support of the federal policy in question, and vice-versa for the ‘losing’ regions. Anticipating
the bargaining process at the heart of federal politics, voters then turn this behaviour to their
advantage by voting for precisely those more supportive and extreme types. If they do not,
moreover, the other side will gain at their expense. As a result, voters are willing to incur the
ideological, reputational or efficiency costs of electing a tough negotiator with more extreme
preferences than their own.
More specifically, citizens in each district cast their vote both in regional as well as federal
elections, in a “citizen-candidate” type of setting. The federal government is a coalition of
regionally elected politicians, formed by a randomly picked formateur. Policy decisions are
made in a cooperative way, so that coalition members have to reach a mutually advantageous
agreement, whilst also defending the interests of their respective regions. Bargaining in the
federal legislation thus reflects regional considerations, which is often observed in real-world
federations (Rodden, 2002; Rodden et al., 2003).4 Indeed, whenever decisions taken on the
federal level follow more from consensus than a simple majority voting rule, and when locally
elected federal politicians start behaving as regional representatives, we can expect region-
oriented bargaining to direct most of distributive federal policy-making.5 Our setting also
allows regions to tax and provide public services, which may be complementary to, or sub-
stitutive of the federal government’s policy. Then, anticipating how this policy is negotiated,
regional politicians and voters alike are in a position to take advantage of the higher-level
policies. Hence, they make (socially) inefficient decisions such as over- or under-spending
because it is in their strategic interest.
To test the model we focus on the European Union (EU). The EU is the world biggest
supranational federation, where representatives of member states continuously bargain over
common policies in the European Parliament (EP), ranging from regulation of labour migra-
tion to a common budget – which in 2018 amounted to 160 billion Euros. The EP corresponds,
in the analysis, to the federal layer of the model, whilst member states correspond to regions
in the model. Following our theoretical predictions, we expect strategic voting behaviour to
mark EP elections but leave national elections unaffected. To proxy the strategic vote for
an extremely protective representative as described in our model, we use Eurosceptic party
support since such parties usually campaign on a platform of protecting the interests of the
4Carozzi and Repetto (2016); Fiva and Halse (2016) show (using Italian and Norwegian data, respectively)
that indeed politicians care about their place of origin even beyond any electoral consideration.
5The direct representation of regions in any central government can also be seen as an automatic product
of the electoral process. Nationwide political parties will always consist of candidates elected in all regions of
the federation, hence any coalition formed on the federal level to a certain extent represents each region when
it comes to making decisions on federal taxation and transfers. This also goes for countries with region-specific
parties, such as Belgium, Spain or Canada. If such parties are part of the federal government their region is
automatically represented as well.
3
member state in question.
To test our prediction that both winning and losing jurisdictions vote for an extremely
protective representative, we group EU member states into winners, losers and those in the
middle. We approximate this using the net-contributions of each member state to the overall
EU budget. This clusters the EU member states in three intuitive groups: the core countries
(mostly early member states), the periphery, and those in between. We hypothesise that voters
in each cluster of countries are on average convinced of their relative status in the union. We
thus assume that voters in the core countries count themselves as overall contributors to EU
policies, voters in the periphery as winners, and voters in the the middle group as unaffected.
What is crucial here is the perception of voters about net-winning or losing positions, and that
would still be true even if they were incongruent with reality.6 For robustness, we replicate
our analysis using Eurobarometer survey data, grouping countries according to average beliefs
of benefiting from EU membership.
Our empirical analysis first of all confirms our prediction that voters elect relatively more
Eurosceptic delegates for the European parliament, as compared to national elections. These
results apply to both sides of the political spectrum, and are robust to different specifications,
definitions of the key variables and a broad set of controls. Crucially, and fully in line with our
predictions, we only find this Eurosceptic support differential in net losing and net winning
member states, but not in countries where EU benefits and contributions are more or less
balanced. We thus uncover a U-shaped relationship between the degree of (perceived) gains
from EU membership and the Eurosceptic vote. The question then remains whether this
Eurosceptic voting gap occurs for the reasons we propose: are these in fact the same people
voting for different parties, and are they doing so because of the strategic reasons we propose?
Our online survey, rolled out in Italy, France and Finland, confirms our predictions on both
accounts.
In what follows, Section 2 presents the theoretical model, whilst the empirical analysis
findings based on the European Union elections are reported in Section 3, and the online
survey results are set out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendices A to C extend the
theoretical model in different ways, proofs are all in Appendix D. Finally, Appendices E and
F complement and extend the empirical analysis. Before moving to the presentation of the
model, we review the related literature and underline what differentiates our work from it.
6In the EU context, one could for example argue that the benefits enjoyed by core countries of being part
of the single market far outweigh the costs of contributing to the EU budget. Our main assumption is then
that the former are far more salient than the latter.
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Related Literature
Our model rationalises why we observe different, and more strategically protective voting
behaviour in elections for higher levels of government as compared to lower levels: the ex-
isting literature on these issues is quite small. In the EU context for example, there is some
evidence suggesting that voters vote for different parties at the national and European level.
Studying empirical regularities first observed by Reif and Schmitt (1980), the “Second-Order”
conjecture suggests that voters use elections that are of second-order relevance to them to
send signals to their representatives and this should explain seemingly non-rational voting
behaviour at supranational elections. Rohrschneider and Clark (2009), Hobolt and Wittrock
(2011), Hix and Marsh (2011) empirically support such results. While they justify the res-
ults based on conjectures only, we propose a solid theoretical framework and empirical test
which are able to explain why voters should act differently depending on the type of election.
Moreover, in our empirical analysis we control for the tenets of the second-order theory and
show that results are not driven by it.
A similar pattern has been observed in the US by Bafumi and Herron (2010), who show
that voters, for federal elections, have a tendency to vote for more extreme parties than their
own ideology would suggest. However, they neither relate their results to voters’ attitudes
with respect to the disconnect between regional and national elections, nor do they present
a justification for such voting behaviour. Krasa and Polborn (2018) theoretically explain the
difference in extremism between local and national policy positions, where the end-goal of
voters is securing a national majority at the possibly very high cost of electing extremely
partisan candidates. Inversely, in our model the strategic reflex of voters is to mitigate the
objectives of federal coalition partners which are in an opposite camp. The two driving
forces could clearly complement each other. To the extent that stronger national parties
undercut the regional ties of federal representatives, lastly, our predictions coincide with those
of Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007). This kind of stronger political centralisation would
indeed better align local political incentives with national interests, as federal legislators in
our model become less malleable to regional electoral pressures.
Second, our work is closely related to the rich theoretical literature on federalism,7 le-
gislative bargaining and strategic delegation.8 Most of the earlier (relevant-to-us) literature
belongs to either of two strands: the bargaining-oriented papers that followed the seminal
7See Alonso et al. (2008); Kessler et al. (2011); Luelfesmann et al. (2015); Gancia et al. (2020) and the
literature therein.
8Strategic delegation has been studied in many different contexts. For instance, a parallelism exists between
our results and Rogoff (1985) where, in the context of the selection of a central banker, the author finds a
rationale to distort the selection of the banker in order to pre-commit to a given type of policy. The introduction
in Coate and Milton (2019) provides an interesting overlook of the general literature on strategic delegation.
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paper of Schelling (1956)9 – with a focus on the bargaining process once a given coalition
forms – and, second, the majoritarian-decision papers that followed Ferejohn et al. (1987)
and Chari et al. (1997)10 – where the question is rather how a certain coalition is formed to
begin with. In the first strand, a strong relative position is vital, so voters have an incentive
to delegate an extreme negotiator that is more likely to obtain a good deal. In the second
strand, voters tend to select milder negotiators which are more likely to be selected by the
formateur to join the winning coalition. Harstad (2010) and Christiansen (2013) bridge the
two groups. The tension between what one can obtain in the coalition and the likelihood of
being part of it is the crucial trade-off there.11
While our results coincide with the bargaining-oriented group in that the selected del-
egate is a more extreme negotiator, our mechanism is different in one crucial way. Both
previous strands of literature consider an environment where being part of the coalition is
essential: all members in the coalition benefit from the policy that is put in place (possibly
to a different extent), while regions that are not represented will not benefit from it (or only
marginally). In our model we take a very different approach: the set of regions that benefits
or looses from the policy is exogenous, so there will inevitably be cases where the coalition
members have opposite objectives, and hence, potential allies outside of the coalition. The
interests of a district are therefore equally protected if the district belongs to the coalition or
if another district with aligned interests does. Choosing a milder negotiator will still increase
the chances of being part of the coalition, but this is no longer essential. Indeed, when we
consider the coalition formation process, the race to choose a mild negotiator is bounded.
Consequently, in a setting that is close to the family of majoritarian-decision papers, we still
find a tendency to select more extreme delegates. Further differences between our setting and
the literature include that strategic incentives in Besley and Coate (2003) only materialise
when the grand coalition is assumed to form. Buisseret and Bernhardt (2018) focuses on
international agreements and assumes no commitment: agreements can be re-negotiated.12
9For example, see Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002); Diermeier et al. (2007); Bowen et al. (2014); Kessler (2014);
Beath et al. (2016); Loeper (2017); Simon and Valasek (2017); Mattozzi and Snowberg (2018); Bouton et al.
(2020) and the literature therein.
10See, for example, Besley and Coate (2003); Knight (2008); Buisseret and Bernhardt (2018); Coate and
Milton (2019) and the literature therein.
11In Harstad (2010), the strategic motive to vote progressively is to enhance a given delegate’s chances to
be included in the coalition, of which all members share the same goal: the expropriation of non-coalition
members. Christiansen (2013), adding a delegation stage to the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007), studies
strategic voting when legislators face a trade-off between public goods provision and targeted spending on
pork projects. In our model there is no such trade-off, as redistributive shares are fixed whilst the budget is
endogenous, so that side-payments in the form of particularistic spending are ruled out.
12Our result that voting also has a strategic element, to constrain the options of federal negotiators in the
future, is similar to the findings of Hatfield and Padró i Miquel (2012). In their model, however, voters adjust
the federal structure of the constitution to partially tie their own hands ex-ante, to rein in their ex-post desire
for federal policies.
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Third, since our model rationalises why voters might elect politically extreme candidates –
a result which is confirmed in our empirical analysis of voting across European countries and
in our online survey – our paper links into the recent literature on populism,13 and provides
an additional and complementary explanation for its rise. The current literature on populism
includes, as a possible explanation, both economic and non-economic explanations. These
include globalisation (Colantone and Stanig, 2018), austerity (Fetzer, 2019), public finance
mismanagement (Daniele et al., 2018) or recessions (Algan et al., 2017), historical heritage
and identity (Cantoni et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019), immigration (Edo et al., 2019) or a
combination of many of them (Guriev, 2018; Rodrik, 2018a). Additionally, all of these sources
of economic insecurity can foment cultural insecurity as well (Guiso et al., 2017; Margalit,
2019). In any case, once populist demand is rising, parties on both sides of the political
spectrum are formed or repositioned to jump into the niche (Rodrik, 2018b).14 In our model,
we provide a complementary explanation, where demand for extremely protectionist delegates
directly affects political supply through via the voting mechanism.
Fourth, our paper also links into the literature on strategic voting (see Kawai and Watanabe,
2013, and the literature therein). We estimate the magnitude of the incentive to vote stra-
tegically in our empirical section which, according to the definition in Kawai and Watanabe
(2013), is a measure of the degree of misaligned voting.15 Our estimates are consistent with
those in the literature, which are in the order of magnitude of 1 to 3%.
2 The Model
We consider a federation where each region r ∈ R is inhabited by a unit mass of citizens.
Per-capita income Yr is exogenous and homogeneous within each region r.
16 Agents care
about private consumption Cr and about public provision, which has a regional component,
Gr, and a federal one, Xr. Finally, agents’ utility depends on Mr, which measures the cost
of being represented by politicians that they may dislike.
The utility of voter j living in region r is defined as
U jr = c (Cr) + θ
j
rx (Gr, Xr) +Mr, (1)
with θjr a relative preference parameter – which can be heterogeneous within and across
13See Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) for a concise survey on populism.
14If this is done successfully, and social stigma attached to radical ideologies is mitigated as a result, demand
for such platforms can moreover be reinforced, as shown by Bursztyn et al. (2017) and Cantoni et al. (2019).
15Misaligned voters are the subset of strategic voters that in equilibrium find it optimal to distort their vote.
Hence, it excludes those strategic voters for whom the best strategic behaviour implies voting their preferred
candidate.
16Given the normalisation of regional population, public provision could entail a local public good, but also
publicly provided private goods.
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regions and can follow any distribution with weakly positive support.
Both c(.) and x(.) are increasing and strictly concave functions. The former expresses util-
ity from consumption, the latter captures utility derived from public provision. Consumption
Cr is financed out of disposable income, so that
Cr = (1− tr)Yr, (2)
Regional taxation tr funds the regional component Gr of public provision:
Gr = trYr. (3)
Crucially, public provision in Eq. (1) has a federal component Xr as well, which complements
regional public provision but is decided on at the federal level. For the sake of generality
we remain agnostic as to the concrete nature of this federal policy.17 We only assume it has
an intensive margin P (γ) – capturing the magnitude, or the intensity of the policy – and an
extensive margin ∆r ∈ < – defining whether the region benefits (∆r > 0) or loses (∆r < 0)
from the policy, so that
Xr = P (γ)∆r. (4)
Parameter γ is endogenously selected and is, ultimately, the element that defines the mag-
nitude of the federal policy Xr. We assume that P
′(γ) > 0.
Lastly, voters are averse to being represented by politicians with preferences different from
their own. This enters the utility function Eq. (1) through Mr. Denoting by θ̂r the ‘type’ of






It follows that Mr measures the disutility of the “political match”: the distance between
the voter’s type θjr and the type of their elected representative.18 Parameter ηr can thus be
thought of as a measure of political pragmatism: when ηr is small, voters are opportunistic, in
the sense that they care mostly about policies, rather then who implements them. Conversely,
when ηr is large, voters are ideological and dislike being represented by someone with whom
they do not share the same political views. Lastly, since regional policies are decided via
direct democracy, Eq. (5) only captures the potential mismatch occurring at the federal level.
17Federal and local policies may complement or crowd out each other (Knight, 2002). Federal grants are a
typical example of substitute policies. Instead, federal investment in infrastructure that increases the marginal
value of local infrastructure would represent a complementary policy. Identically, environmental policies may
be a complement to local policies to promote tourism.
18See also Krasa and Polborn (2018) and Buisseret and Bernhardt (2018) for similar modeling assumptions.
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Timing Closing the model, we turn to the timing of electoral and policy decisions. Agents in
each region act first: each region marks a constituency where every citizen directly votes over
the local tax rate tr, which determines both consumption Cr and the regional contribution
to the local public good Gr. Every single voter is also a potential federal candidate, running
to represent the interest of the region within the federal government. Agents in each region
cast, together with the vote over tr, also a vote over who should represent their region on the
federal level. Candidates differ in their parameter θjr and, as previously remarked, the elected
agent in region r is denoted θ̂r. The federal government moves second and chooses Xr. A
coalition of federal representatives bargains on the level of γ, which defines the magnitude
P (γ) of the federal policy Xr as expressed by Eq. (4).
We denote by k ∈ K ⊆ R the federal representatives that belong to the federal coalition,
and allow for a randomly selected formateur to steer the formation process. Once the federal
coalition is formed, decisions are taken cooperatively so that federal transfers maximise the
joint utility of the coalition members. When K = R, a grand coalition forms that includes
all regions, which can be thought the result of a specified institutional arrangement or the
product of the political constellation at hand. In any case, cooperative bargaining is driven
by a threat point which we conceive as the risk of re-election after a continued disagreement,
with the eventual loss of power as a result. This translates into the disutility of losing political
benefits, wages, or more generally, all possible kinds of (ego)rents enjoyed simply by staying
in office.
Clearly, Eq. (1) meets all the requirements in Gans and Smart (1996) and therefore the
median voter theorem applies. We solve the model backward, first computing the federal
policy selected by the federal coalition, after which we analyse the decisions made by the
median voter in each region r. Section 2.1 considers the two-region case.
2.1 Two-Region Setting
With two regions, we have that |R| = 2. In this scenario, we focus on the grand coalition,
that is K = R, where both regions are represented in the federal coalition. We denote regions
in the coalition as α and β, so that K = {α, β}.
Now, with only two regions, the interesting policy to focus on is the one where if one
region benefits from the policy (∆r > 0), the other one necessarily loses out (∆r < 0).
19 For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that this is a zero-sum game, that is,
∆r = {−δ, δ} (6)
19We could actually have a policy that negatively(/positively) affects both regions in the coalition. We do
not analyse this trivial case in which the policy basically is Pareto inferior(/superior) to anything else, hence
there would be unanimous consensus on how to set the policy at either extreme.
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and ∆α = −∆β.20
Solving the model backward, Section 2.1.1 analyses the second (last) period decisions,
while Section 2.1.2 solves the equilibrium in the first period and discusses the findings.
2.1.1 The Federal Government
We assume this federal government will seek the weighted utilitarian bargaining solution to














c (Ck) + θ̂kx (Gk, Xk)− Fk
)
, (7)
where Ûk is the utility of the representative elected in region k, that is obtained by rewriting
Eq. (1) for θk = θ̂k. The weight of region k in the bargaining process is ωk, while Fk represents
the cost, for an elected politician, of not being able to form a coalition and hence the threat
of losing power and its associated benefits, with Fk =
{
0, if a coalition is formed
F̄k, otherwise
. We
assume F̄k to be sufficiently large for coalitions to always form. Should this not be the case,
the solution of the model is isomorphic to the case of no federal government that is analysed
at the end of Section 2.1.2.
How a specific candidate rose to power in region k in period 1, in other words why they
were elected, will be dealt with in Section 2.1.2, where we discuss the local voting mechanism.
For now, it suffices to see that the utility of an elected legislator Ûk is defined by their
appreciation of public and private consumption in their constituency, where θ̂k in Eq. (7)
defines the relative weight assigned to the public good.
Deriving and rewriting the first order conditions of the optimisation problem defined by
Eq. (7) and subject to Eqs. (2) to (4), the optimal intensive margin parameter γ is implicitly
expressed by
ωαθ̂α∆αP
′(γ)x′2 (Gα, Xα) + ωβ θ̂β∆βP
′(γ)x′2 (Gβ, Xβ) = 0. (8)









with φf ≡ ωαθ̂αx′2 (Gα, Xα)− ωβ θ̂βx′2 (Gβ, Xβ) .
(9)
Eq. (9) implicitly captures how the (federal) intensive margin P (γ) responds to regional
decisions. This is an important relation: indeed, how agents are tempted to distort their
20This assumption can be easily relaxed, as long as it is ensured that some regions with positive and negative
∆ are both represented within the federal government.
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decisions depends on their expectations on the federal government’s behaviour, which in turn
depends on whether regional and federal policies are strategic complements (x′′1,2(·) > 0) or
substitutes (x′′1,2(·) < 0). Lemma 1 precisely analyses how the federal choice reacts to changes
in the local component Gα of the public policy.
21


























Whenever regional and federal policies are strategic complements (x′′1,2(·) > 0), an increase
of regional public provision pushes the federal government to reinforce (/temper) its policy
P (γ) if the expansion occurred in the benefiting (/losing) region. All the opposite is true when
regional and federal policies are strategic substitutes (x′′1,2(·) < 0).
















Proof. See Appendix D.
Lemma 1 shows it is optimal for the federal government to boost its support for the
winning region, whenever the latter spends additional funds to finance higher levels of the
public good. Since regional spending erodes consumption and hence also utility, as shown by
Eq. (2), the federal government compensates for this welfare loss by increasing the intensity
of the federal policy γ if it works complementary to the public good Gr, and vice versa. The
opposite is true for the losing region: lowering the magnitude of the federal policy compensates
for utility losses of diminished consumption, which serves as a similar compensating measure
if the federal and regional policies are complementary, and vice versa.
What we also learn from Eq. (9) and Lemma 1, is that the federal response to regional
spending decisions depends on the preference types θ̂α and θ̂β of the federal legislators elected
respectively in regions α and β. If for example a region is represented by a legislator who for
some reason puts more weight on public provision, this can be expected to have an effect on
federal responses to regional choices. We elaborate in Lemma 2.
21Without loss of generality, we consider the case of region α.
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= sgn (∆α). Hence, for representatives elected in the winning (losing) region,
the more they have a taste for public provision, the more the federal government increases
(reduces) the intensity of the federal policy.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition here is that representatives that find public provision more important, will
generally want to steer federal policy making in that direction. They will be tougher negoti-
ators in the federal bargaining process, and hence intensify the federal policy if they represent
a winning region, and the opposite if they were elected in a losing region. Clearly, the ques-
tion at this point becomes which preference type will emerge from the local election process.
Section Section 2.1.2 provides us with an answer.
2.1.2 Local Elections and Government
Local elections define the quantity of public good Gk to be produced in each region, as well as
the local tax tk that partially finances the public good. Voters also select the representative
θ̂k who joins the federal government and negotiates γ in the name of region k, staying true
to their preference type as is the common assumption in citizen-candidate settings.
The voters’ objective function, defined by Eq. (1), is optimised under constraints imposed
by Eqs. (2) to (5). Lemma 3 presents the results of the maximisation.22
Lemma 3. Eqs. (13) to (14) implicitly define the preferences of the median voter in region


















ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, Xα) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′
2,2 (Gβ, Xβ)
) = 2ηα(θ̂α − θmα )
θmα
. (14)
Proof. See Appendix D.
22Notice that in Eqs. (13) to (14) both θ̂α and θ
m
α appear. This is because the median voter is decisive in
the election, hence the presence of θmα . Yet voters also anticipate the strategic role of politicians at the federal
level, so that θ̂α follows from the strategic and forward looking behaviour of the local median voter.
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Proposition 1 and its corollaries develop around the results in Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 (Strategic Voting). Suppose that a cooperative legislature of regionally elected
representatives has to bargain over the intensity (γ) of federal policies (Xk). Then, in all
regions where the federal policy directly affects the utility of public provision (∆k 6= 0), voters
will strategically elect candidates with a preference for public provision strictly stronger than
their own (θ̂k > θ
m
k ). If a region neither benefits nor loses from the federal policy (∆k = 0)
then local elections will not be distorted by strategic voting (θ̂k = θ
m
k ).











where µ(θk) = (θ̂k−θ
m
k )/θmk is the mark-up in terms of θk, that is, the percentage increase in θk
from the median voter to the federal representative in region k.
Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Proposition 1, elected federal representatives always have a strictly-stronger
preference for public provision than the median voter, conditional on their region’s welfare
being at stake. This may be surprising at first, since this implies the median voter is bound to
select a representative with preferences different from theirs. And this occurs despite the fact
that the median voter’s utility depends negatively on the distance between their type and the
elected representative type. This is explained by the fact that the median voter anticipates the
federal bargaining process and, hence, pre-commits to a more extreme stand to manoeuvre
their representative in a – at least for them – more favourable bargaining position at the
outset of negotiations.
This evidences the strategic behaviour of both median voters, who make full use of the
knowledge that if they vote for a candidate with preferences of this kind, their welfare will
go up. The reason for the latter is given by Lemma 2, which states that the federal policy
intensity γ – and thus the federal contribution Xk(γ,∆k) to public provision – is increasing
in θ̂k for the winning region and vice versa for the losing one. From the median voter’s
perspective therefore, a more extreme representative will always bargain for more public
provision x(.), resulting in higher utility. Higher θ̂k types more gladly negotiate for higher, or
lower federal intervention γ to bring public good consumption up. Knowing this in advance,
voters turn this behaviour to their advantage by voting in precisely such types.
Importantly, this kind of strategic voting occurs both in winning and losing districts, but
for different reasons. In the winning region voters will distort federal elections to guarantee
more federal support through higher intervention, whilst the losing region strategically sends
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a representative keen on lowering federal support. The key channel here is the fact that there
is some redistribution at the federal level, which is confirmed by Proposition 1. Indeed, when
federal policy is conceived as strictly non-redistributive, the level of federal intervention loses
its strategic appeal to voters who will then vote sincerely. When there is some redistribution
organised at the federal level, however, the question becomes which region will distort the
elections the most, and why.
Eq. (15) helps us to analyse the determining factors driving the strategic voting defined
in Proposition 1 and to be able to compare these factors between regions. Results imply
that the strategic pre-commitment of the median voter (measured by the left-hand side of the
equation) depends on both the relative size of the disutility ηk from being ‘misrepresented’ as
well as the relative marginal utility of federal intervention. Clearly, for the symmetric case in
which ηmα = η
m







means that the distortion is relatively larger in the region in which the marginal impact of
the federal policy is larger. In particular, take the case where regional provision Gk and the
federal policy Xk are strategic complements (i.e. x
′′
1,2 (Gk, Xk) > 0) and assume that x(·) is
symmetric. Should the local tax tk be the same in both districts, then the richer region would
have an incentive to distort more. Conversely, under the same setting but with strategic
substitutes (i.e. x′′1,2 (Gk, Xk) < 0), the poorer region would distort more when it comes to
selecting its federal representative.23
Myopic, naive and sophisticated voters In our model agents are sophisticated, as they
are able to fully understand and anticipate the mechanism. We now compute two benchmarks
that we will use for comparison with our equilibrium characterised by Lemma 3.
The first benchmark corresponds to the case of myopic voters. Here, voters ignore com-
pletely all mechanisms at work at the federal level and act as if γ were fixed. This case
is particularly interesting because it coincides with the case of no federal intervention or if
federal policies are set in stone in the constitution.
The second benchmark represents naive voters, who understand how local taxation (tr)
affects the choice of γ, yet they do not anticipate that the choice of the elected politician (θ̂r)
is also affecting γ. This could happen if voters, for example, misunderstand the competence
of different federal institutions.
For that, we first rewrite Eq. (13) for k = α.
23As an example, we can think of a federal policy that simply consists in a transfer of money from one region
to another. In this case, local and federal funds are strategic substitutes. Then, the model suggests that the
poorest region will be more aggressive and choose a more extreme federal politician.
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The “sophisticated” tax rate tsα is set implicitly at:










Similarly, the “naive” tax rate tnα is set implicitly at:














Finally, the “myopic” tax rate tmα is set implicitly at:
c′(Cα)− θmα x′1 (Gα, Xα) = 0 (18)
Proposition 2. Taking the myopic agent as a benchmark – as an equivalent to the case of
exogenous federal policy – the distortion in terms of local taxes is always more pronounced
with sophisticated voters than with naive ones.
Corollary 2. When local and federal policy are strategic complements (x′′1,2(Gr, Xr) > 0),





when local and federal policy are strategic substitutes (x′′1,2(Gr, Xr) < 0), sophisticated voters





Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: while the cost of distorting the vote
is the same for everyone, sophisticated voters fully anticipate its marginal benefit and, hence,
optimally calibrate the distortion. Naive voters underestimate the benefit. Myopic voters do
not anticipate any benefit at all, hence they do not distort their vote.24
While Proposition 2 stresses the magnitude of the distortion, maximal for strategic voters
and minimal for the myopic ones, Corollary 2 focuses on the direction of the distortion. When
federal and local policy are complements, the benefit comes from inflating the local tax, hence
if voters in a region are strategic they will vote for a larger local tax. Conversely, when policies
are substitutes, the benefit is obtained by reducing the local tax. Then naive voters will reduce
it compared to myopic voters, but strategic voters will reduce it even more.
24Taking the naive behaviour as a benchmark, we implicitly suggested that this is the neutral behaviour
and that any deviation represents a distortion. Nonetheless, other distortions may also materialise (Harstad,
2007), in which case it may well be that the distortion due to strategic voting partially offsets other distortions,
leading to a superior equilibrium.
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Strategic Voting and Gerrymandering Our results show that multi-level governments
can – at least partially – explain the rise of political extremism in the form of strategic
protectionism at higher levels of government. Several components determine the proportion
of this phenomenon: 1) the relative bargaining power of regions within the federal government
(ω) is a primitive of the model that can hardly be modified by the legislator; 2) the level of
interregional redistribution (∆) depends on the institutional setting and can be modified by
the legislator but often it is a politically very costly task; 3) several attributes of the median
voter in each jurisdiction (their preferences θ, the slope and concavity of their preferences
over the publicly provided good, their income and their disutility from political diversity).
Now, politicians in power often have the authority to, quite arbitrarily, modify the geo-
graphical boundaries of jurisdictions. This is usually done in order to modify the composition
of the electorate within a jurisdiction and, hence, enhance the chances of being re-elected.
Such practice is known as gerrymandering. Common wisdom suggests that gerrymandering
may increase polarisation because districts become safer and hence there is less need to at-
tract the moderate voters. By realigning the electoral base, gerrymandering may affect the
identity of the median voter who, in turn, is the ultimate cause of the undesired distortions.25
This leads us to conclude that, should indeed gerrymandering cause a change in the identity
of the median voter, who becomes more extreme, then the effects highlighted in our model
may be amplified. At the same time, a benevolent legislator may also use gerrymandering
to instead reduce the distortion produced by strategic delegation. Either way, should one be
willing to estimate the costs and benefits of gerrymandering, we claim that our channel, that
operates through strategic delegation, should not be ignored.
2.2 Extensions
Three-region setting In Appendix A we extend the analysis by adding one region to the
federal constellation studied above (|R| = 3). We focus on the most interesting case when a
coalition of two forms (K = {α, β} ⊂ R), with one winner and one loser. We denote z the
region that is left out of the coalition.26
Comparing the federal policy with two and three regions, we find (Proposition 3) that it is
more generous with three regions when the excluded one is a loser while the opposite is true
25The empirical tests in McCarty et al. (2009) suggest that the impact of gerrymandering on the identity
of the decisive voter are quite small. Krasa and Polborn (2018) suggests that results in McCarty et al. (2009)
may be downward biased and that the effect may be larger.
26When the grand coalition forms, the equilibrium is isomorphic to when |R| = 2 and its study does not
bring new insights. The case of a coalition of regions of the same kind is trivial and inevitably leads to a corner
equilibrium: when both regions in the coalition are recipients, they set the largest possible federal policy and
extract all surplus from the excluded region. When both regions are contributors, they repeal the policy and
set it to the lowest possible level.
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when z is a winner. This simply occurs because the federal government is not internalising the
costs and benefits of region z. Furthermore, we can conclude (Lemma 4) that the marginal
impact of a change in locally-defined parameters tk and θ̂ is more pronounced with three
regions if the excluded region is a loser (∆z < 0), while the opposite is true when z is a












) larger with 2 regions
Policy (γ) and





larger with 3 regions
Figure 1: Size of the policy (γ) and marginal impacts ( ∂γ
∂θ̂k
and ∂γ∂tk ) in the (k − z) space
The presence of region z provides different incentives to regions, depending if their interests
are aligned with or opposed to z. In particular, (Proposition 4) we show that in equilibrium
a region’s mark-up (µ(θk)) is larger in the 3-region case for the region of type opposite to z
(sgn(∆k) 6= sgn(∆z)) while it is larger in the 2-region case for the region with type equal to
z (sgn(∆k) = sgn(∆z)), as summarised in Fig. 2.
Strategic Behaviour and Beliefs Our main framework assumes that elected delegates
have a certain say in federal negotiations, and that agents are fully rational, in the sense that
they perfectly understand the institutional setting and act strategically, thus taking advantage
of the system as much as possible. In Appendix B we relax both assumptions and assume
that agents assign a region-specific probability pk to the fact that their elected politician will
be able to impact federal policy-making, and thus the federal policy intensity γ as previously
described. With probability 1− pk, instead, they will not influence the federal government’s
















Figure 2: Mark-up µ(θk) in the (k − z) space
There can be several ways to rationalise such beliefs. Amongst others, voters may believe
that 1 − pk is the probability that a coalition forms, but with their own representative kept
out of the formation process.27
While this has no impact on the choice made at the federal level, it impacts how decisions
are made at the local level. If agents believe that their choice does not always have an impact,
their expected benefit from manipulating their behaviour is reduced and, following Lemma 5,
they distort tk and θ̂k less.
Coalition formation In Appendix C we add more structure and study the coalition-
formation process. This serves two purposes. On the one hand, we show that the coalition
of two regions of opposite types, studied in Appendix A, is a plausible equilibrium outcome.
On the other hand, we provide a micro-foundation for the setting in Appendix B: voters have
to make conjectures for the likelihood of their representative being the formateur that shapes
the federal minimum winning coalition.
We show that all possible combinations collapse into a formulation where pk relates to
endogenous federal decision-making and 1 − pk to a setting where γ is exogenously set (γ̂),
hence we can directly apply all results from Appendix B. In particular, we conclude that the
coalition formation process introduces some uncertainty on the side of voters, which translates
into being more cautious when it comes to the choice of the local tax tk and the type of the
federal representative θ̂k. Indeed, when we consider the coalition formation process, the race
27We work out this micro-foundation of beliefs in Appendix C.
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to choose a mild negotiator to be included in the coalition is bounded by the lowest type
θ̂k, if higher than all median voter types. This is because the set of regions that benefits
or looses from the policy is exogenous, so there will inevitably be cases where the coalition
members have opposite objectives, and hence, potential allies outside of the coalition. The
interests of a district are therefore equally protected if the district belongs to the coalition or
if another district with aligned interests does. Choosing a milder negotiator will still increase
the chances of being part of the coalition, but this is no longer essential.
3 Empirical Analysis: European vs National Elections
In this section, we provide evidence on some of our key predictions. The model shows that
citizens prefer candidates with more extremely protective preferences than their own, when
casting their vote for federal elections. Conversely, we do not expect such distortion to
characterise elections at lower levels of jurisdiction, in which case citizens will vote more
sincerely. An important corollary is that the strategic effect occurs only in benefiting and
losing regions and not where the benefit and cost of the federal policy are of similar magnitude.
3.1 Hypothesis
We assess these predictions focusing on elections in the European Union (EU). This is an
ideal setting for our model as: i) the EU is the world’s largest supra-national federation,
enveloping the fiscal policy of 27 different countries with respect to justice, home affairs,
trade, agriculture and regional development and ii) EU citizens are called to elect national
as well as European delegates, where the former correspond to regional politicians while the
latter match federal politicians in our model. As a proxy for the extremely protective political
type in the model, we consider the aggregate performances of Eurosceptic as compared to
non-Eurosceptic parties. Specifically, following Proposition 1, our main hypothesis is that
voters will anticipate the bargaining over EU policymaking taking place in Brussels, and
consequently favour Eurosceptic parties relatively more at the European (federal) than at the
national (regional) level: this reasoning implies that voters consider Eurosceptic politicians
better at striking good deals for their own country in the European political arena.
Our measure of extremely protective political parties strictly resembles the one adopted
by Colantone and Stanig (2019), who discuss the recent surge in economic nationalism across
Europe. Specifically, we match their interest for isolationist and nationalist parties.28
The European setting thus forms an ideal testing ground for our predictions. As discussed
in Section 1, previous studies have focused on differences in party performances between
28Differently from Colantone and Stanig (2019), our definition does not include economic conservative parties,
as this dimension is not part of the model.
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national and supranational elections. The most established approach is based on the idea
that European elections represent a “Second-Order” election, in which citizens cast their
vote based on domestic preferences. Its tenets are: i) turnout is lower in European than
in national elections; ii) citizens prefer smaller parties at the European level, and iii) they
tend to penalise parties which are part of their respective national government. This leads to
a general punishment of the governing parties, especially when the European elections take
place during the mid-term of the national election cycle. In the empirical analysis, we include
covariates to exclude the possibility that our findings might be driven by this “Second-Order”
theory.
A peculiarity of the EU setting is the presence of Eurosceptic parties, which in some cases
are openly advocating the dissolution of the EU. Therefore, voting for Eurosceptic parties
might be considered as casting a preference for politicians who aim to demolish the European
integration project as a whole, rather than bringing about more favorable conditions for
their constituencies – which is our interpretation here. This would not be in contrast with
our interpretation, if we consider that the most extreme parties are pursuing such a hard
(and potentially fatal for the federation) bargaining strategy just to obtain more favorable
conditions for their countries. Indeed, many analysts would argue that most Eurosceptics are
not out to destroy EU institutions and funding mechanisms, but rather want to turn these to
their advantage (Henceroth, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2011, 2013).29
3.2 Data
First, we create a dataset including the vote share of all parties at national and European
elections, for parties running at least at one national and one European election.30 The data
are based on the “Election and Referendum Database”, which provides election results for
European countries, starting from 1990. Second, based on Algan et al. (2017), we classify
parties in Eurosceptic or not-Eurosceptic ones. Algan et al. (2017) is based on the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey, an established source, which estimates party positioning on European
integration and ideology31. Algan et al. (2017) extends it including some brand-new and
small parties. As European and national elections very often do not take place in the same
year, we consider a time window of 5 years for each political party. Then, we calculate the
difference between a party vote share at the European and at the national elections within
this period (DiffEU-Nat). Therefore, positive (negative) values imply that a party gets higher
29The UK clearly represents an exception to this reasoning. Interestingly, after the Brexit referendum,
continental Eurosceptic parties have generally shifted their position away from advocating the dissolution of
the EU.
30A clear limitation of this approach is that we cannot detect parties’ performances when they enter a
coalition, as we only observe the overall coalition votes share. This leads to an overall smaller sample size.
31https://www.chesdata.eu/
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vote shares at the European (national) elections. While European elections take place every 5
years, national elections do not have the same schedule across EU countries. If more than one
national election took place in a specific time window, we consider a party average vote share.
If a party runs only for one national or one European election in a specific 5-year time period,
we would have a missing observation. We consider the first 5-year period starting from the
first European election in our dataset (in 1994). Therefore, the periods are 1990-1994; 1995-
1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2009; 2010-2014. Different definitions of these 5-year time windows do
not affect our findings. In the Appendix, we also consider a 10-year time window: our results
are very similar to the ones based on a 5-year time window. We prefer the 5-year window as
this maximises the number of observations in our sample. In Table 6 of the Appendix, we
replicate our main findings considering a different 5-year window, centring each window on
the year of EU elections (1992-1996; 1997-2001; 2002-2006; 2007-2011; 2012-2016).
Fig. 3 reports the distribution of our dependant variable (DiffEU-Nat). The figure high-
lights a different distribution for parties considered as Eurosceptic, which generally receive
a higher vote share in European than in national elections. Fig. 11 highlights a very sim-
ilar pattern when considering a 10-year time window. To validate this descriptive evidence,
we estimate a simple OLS model, in which the dependent variable is the above-mentioned
variable (DiffEU-Nat) and the main explanatory variable is a dummy set equal to 1 for Euro-
sceptic parties, based on Algan et al. (2017). To control for differences across countries and
common time trends, we include (5-year) time-windows and country fixed effects. In a more
demanding specification, we include time-country fixed effects.
The “Second-Order” theory might affect these estimates in several ways. First, Euro-
sceptic parties are often small ones, and if small parties are more likely to be voted for at
the European level, we might just be capturing this effect. Therefore, we include a variable
measuring the average vote share of a party in a specific time window. Note that this might
be an endogenous control variable since, if our theory is correct, our model might explain why
small parties – if they are also Eurosceptic – are rewarded in European elections in the first
place.
Second, another bias could be introduced by the electoral system, as some countries, hold-
ing national elections under a majoritarian system and European ones under a proportional
system, might differentially reward small parties across the two types of elections.32 We
tackle this issue in two alternative ways: i) we compute an index measuring the degree of
proportionality of an electoral system, the so called “cube law” (Taagepera, 1973; Bol et al.,
2019; Matakos et al., 2016; Piolatto, 2011) and use it as a control in our estimation;33 ii) we
32Conversely, all EU countries, in the period of interest, held European elections under some form of pro-
portional representation.
33This index takes value zero if an elector system assigns seats equally to all parties, regardless of the share
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report our findings dropping countries with a mixed or a majoritarian system at the national
elections.
Third, Eurosceptic parties might be systematically rewarded or punished if they are part
of the incumbent or the challenger coalition. To reduce this concern, we include a dummy set
equal to 1 for the most voted for party in each country-time window period.
Fourth, lower turnout at the European elections might differently affect Eurosceptic
parties. In turn, we control for turnout differences between national and European elec-
tions.34
Moreover, in some specifications, we include time-country fixed effects to control for all
potential country level time-varying changes.
Figure 3: Differences in Voting between EU and National Elections across Eurosceptic and
not-Eurosceptic Parties
The figure shows the distributions of votes for parties participating in European and National elections in the period 1990-2013, differen-
tiating between Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic Parties.
of votes. It reaches value one for proportional systems. Values above one represent systems, such as First Past
The Post, where larger parties obtain a share of seats that is larger than the proportion of collected votes.
The larger the value of the parameter, the larger the premium for large parties.




Table 1: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.869*** 1.892*** 2.017*** 1.781*** 2.242** 2.274** 2.644*** 2.144**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.466** -2.478** -2.887*** -2.450**
(0.973) (0.972) (1.038) (1.089)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 1.096 1.070 0.653 1.285
(1.159) (1.157) (1.340) (1.420)
Diff Turnout -0.0129 -0.0120 0.00846 -0.0136 -0.0121 0.00895
(0.00969) (0.00980) (0.0135) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0136)
Cube Law 0.441 0.494 0.409 0.478
(0.964) (0.944) (1.042) (1.019)




Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,140 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,140
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.042 0.128 0.028 0.032 0.051 0.137
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule is an
index capturing the degree of proportionality of the electoral system; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles splits countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We report our findings in Table 1, in Columns 1 to 4, in which we gradually include our
set of controls. Control variables do not play an important role, except for party size. This is
in line with the “Second-Order” Theory, which predicts smaller parties are indeed more likely
to perform better at EU elections.35 Across the board, however, our results strongly suggest
that Eurosceptic parties are more likely to be elected to the European parliament than to
its national counterparts. This effect is sizeable (almost 40% of the standard deviation) and
statistically significant across all models. Table 5 in the Appendix considers a winsorised
version at 99% of the dependent variable, while we test the same specification in Table 7
using a 10-year time window. In both cases our results are confirmed.
Our approach highlights that a Eurosceptic party profile is a salient dimension to determ-
35Note the Cule Rule coefficient is not estimated when introducing country fixed effects. Similarly, the Diff
Turnout coefficient cannot be estimated when introducing Country-Time fixed effects.
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Table 2: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections - without Majoritarian/Mixed Sys-
tems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.668*** 1.685*** 1.637*** 1.441** 2.665*** 2.676*** 2.962*** 2.535**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.890*** -2.877*** -3.192*** -2.840**
(0.964) (0.975) (1.050) (1.172)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 0.174 0.171 -0.562 -0.196
(1.057) (1.076) (1.181) (1.174)
Diff Turnout -0.0132 -0.0154 0.000119 -0.0138 -0.0151 0.000526
(0.00925) (0.00909) (0.0227) (0.00905) (0.00929) (0.0228)
Cube Law -0.135 -0.199 0.0866 0.0123
(0.978) (0.945) (0.902) (0.881)




Observations 825 825 833 835 825 825 833 835
R-squared 0.016 0.021 0.043 0.149 0.029 0.033 0.054 0.158
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule
is index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ine differential strategic voting at the EU level. An alternative approach could be to consider
the traditional ideological dimension, comparing moderate and extreme right/left parties, as
a proxy for strategic voting. However, our intuition is that the extreme protection of national
interests in the current European political scenario can be best captured by the fracture
between Eurosceptic and Pro-European parties. To validate this reasoning, we replicate our
findings (Columns 1 to 4) in Appendix Table 8, controlling for whether a party is classified as
extreme on the ideological spectrum (note that only 50% of Eurosceptic parties are classified
as extreme ones). While our findings are unaffected by this control, the extreme dummy is
never statistically significant.
In mixed or majoritarian systems, citizens might be more likely to strategically cast their
vote at the national level, in turn, favouring moderate and pro-Europe parties. Conversely,
they might be more likely to express their ideological preferences at the European elections,
based on a proportional electoral system. While in Table 1 we include as a control the
“cube rule” index (which is never statistically significant), in Table 2 (columns 1 to 4) we
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test the robustness of our findings dropping from our sample countries holding a mixed or
a majoritarian electoral system at the national level. This classification is based on the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Asstistance (International IDEA). At
the European level, all countries use a proportional system with national specificities.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects
Similarly to our model in which there are winning and losing jurisdictions, EU countries
can be classified into winners, losers and neutral in terms of EU status. An objective way
to approximate this is to use the net-contributions of each member state to the overall EU
budget.
The EU budget, which in 2015 was 145 billion Euros, represents a crucial source of finan-
cing for the poorest EU members, as well as for firms in several economic sectors (e.g. energy
and agriculture) across all EU countries. Similar to our model specifications, some countries
– such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden – are net contributors to the EU budget,
others are net receiving members and others contribute as much as they receive. For instance,
in the period 2000-2015, the net transfers received from the EU represented 3,53% of the GNI
for Lithuania, 2,9% for Bulgaria and 2,11% for Poland.36 Conversely, based on this measure,
the Netherlands was the main EU net contributor (-0.41% of GNI). Following the model, we
should expect a stronger bias toward Eurosceptic voting (at the European elections) in net
receiving and net contributing member states, but less so in countries contributing about as
much as they receive. To test this prediction, we consider the share of EU net contributions
as a percentage of the gross national income (GNI) in the period 2000-2015, as depicted in
Fig. 4. We then split countries in three groups, in which the top 33% includes the most
generous net-contributors, such as the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, and the bottom
33% the most net receiving countries. Interestingly, the split in tertiles allows for a U-shape
test, as we expect a stronger effect in the top (net-contributors) and in the bottom tertile
(net-receiving), while strategic Eurosceptic voting should matter less in countries in which
contributions (to the EU) are, more or less, equal to the transfers (from the EU).
In Columns 5 to 8 of Table 1, we interact the Eurosceptic dummy with this categorical
variable. The coefficient Eurosceptic represents the effect of the omitted base category, i.e.
the top 33% net contributors countries.
Columns 5 to 8 in Table 1 confirm our predictions. The effect materialises only in the top
and the bottom tertile (lines 1 and 7), while there is no such effect for Eurosceptic parties
in the intermediate tertile (line 6): these countries represent an ideal control group, as they
36These data are available on the website of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/
financialreport/2015/revenue/index_en.html
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Figure 4: Net Transfers from the EU as % of GNI (2000-2015)
The figure shows the net transfers received from the EU budget as % of GNI in the period 2000-2015 for each EU country: the two red
lines split countries in three tertiles.
Figure 5: Net Transfers from the EU in billion euros (2000-2015)
The figure shows the net transfers received from the EU budget in billion euros in the period 2000-2015 for each EU country: the two red
lines split countries in three tertiles.
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receive more or less as much from the EU budget as they contribute to it. In line with our
model, we find a higher, although not statistically significant, effect in the third tertile (top
net receiving countries). A similar pattern emerges from Columns 5 to 8 of Table 8 and
Table 2. 37 As complementary evidence, we plot our data differentiating between Eurosceptic
and moderate parties. Specifically, in Figure Fig. 6, on the vertical axis, we plot the country
level 5-year average of the dependent variable (DiffEU-Nat) for the two groups of parties:
on the left (right) side Eurosceptic (Moderate) parties. On the horizontal axis, we plot the
net transfers as % of GNI similarly to Figure Fig. 4. The figure quite clearly shows the U-
shaped pattern for the Eurosceptic plot, whereas no clear trend is visible on the right side for
moderate parties.
In Table 3, we group countries based on two alternative measures. First, we consider an
alternative classification, which is not based on an objective measure (as EU contributions)
but on citizens perceptions. In columns 1 to 4, we consider a survey question collected by the
Eurobarometer38 across EU countries (since 1983), i.e. the share of individuals agreeing with
the statement “Taking everything in consideration, would you say your country has benefited
from being a member of the European Union?”. We calculate the average response for each
country over time. This classification allows a split in tertiles based on citizens perception
of their country as a “loser” or a “winner” of the EU project, instead of objective economic
measures.
Second, in columns 5 to 8 of Table 3, we use an alternative measure of EU contributions:
we consider countries’ absolute average contribution in the period 2000-2015 (in this case,
Germany is the top net-contributor with a yearly contribution of almost 9 billion Euros, as
shown in Fig. 5). Finally, in Appendix Section F, we investigate whether these effects depend
on the size of the federation, focusing on the EU enlargement in 2004.
Finally, in Appendix Table 9, we consider an alternative explanation for our findings.
Eurosceptic parties might be more successful at the EU elections because their manifesto is
built around EU topics, which are naturally more salient right before EU elections. This
might provide them with higher media exposure and in turn, more votes. However, this
reasoning is true also for strongly pro-EU political parties. Therefore, to reduce concerns
related to this reasoning, in Table 9, we restrict the sample to these two groups of parties
(pro-EU and Eurosceptic ones). Similarly to our main definition of Eurosceptic parties, we
classify pro-EU parties based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey.39 Our main findings are
37Note that in Table 2 this test is highly demanding as four out of six countries holding (at least for some
years) a mixed or majoritarian system are in the first tertile, i.e. France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom.
The other two are Hungary and Lithuania.
38https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/
eb-trends-trend-files/list-of-trends/membership-benefit
39Specifically, to classify pro-EU parties, we consider the question: ”Overall orientation of the party leader-
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confirmed also in this case, although the estimated coefficients are considerably more noisy:
this is not surprising considering that we are dropping the majority of the observations.
Table 3: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections: Benefit of EU membership (1-4)
and Absolute Contributions (5-8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 2.726*** 2.745*** 2.891*** 2.620*** 1.920*** 1.950*** 2.211*** 1.740***
(0.593) (0.598) (0.657) (0.667) (0.491) (0.491) (0.528) (0.520)
2ndtertile 0.726* 0.678* 0.240 0.230
(0.400) (0.399) (0.545) (0.554)
3rdtertile 0.471 0.449 -0.0226 -0.0359
(0.491) (0.490) (0.345) (0.348)
Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.219*** -2.225*** -2.299*** -2.128** -2.193** -2.199** -2.936*** -2.504**
(0.795) (0.798) (0.841) (0.862) (0.893) (0.901) (0.934) (1.004)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile -0.664 -0.648 -0.653 -0.667 0.708 0.683 0.475 1.122
(0.973) (0.976) (1.043) (1.035) (0.846) (0.850) (0.895) (0.907)
Diff Turnout -0.00999 -0.00936 0.0145 -0.0114 -0.0105 0.0139
(0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0111)
Cube Law 0.391 0.481 0.408 0.465
(1.085) (1.090) (0.991) (0.994)




Interactions: Benefit EU Benefit EU Benefit EU Benefit EU Abs Contr Abs Contr Abs Contr Abs Contr
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,140 1,140 1,128 1,128 1,140 1,140
R-squared 0.025 0.028 0.046 0.132 0.023 0.026 0.047 0.134
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size is
a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule is
index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national and
European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on share of people agreeing their country has benefited of being a EU
member (columns 1 to 4); their level of net EU transfers in absolute values (columns 5 to 8). The omitted category is the first tertile
(largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4 Survey Evidence: Strategic Eurosceptic Voting
In the previous section, we show that Europeans tend to vote more for Eurosceptic parties
at the European level than at the national level, especially when they are in net receiving or
contributing countries. Our key assumption is that this pattern is due to a strategic voting
behaviour, whereby Eurosceptic parties are considered more fit to bargain at the EU level
and protect national interests in the process.
To validate this assumption we run an online survey in cooperation with Qualtrics XM.
ship towards European integration” (whose replies go from 1 – Strongly opposed – to 7 – strongly in favor –).
We classify as pro-EU, parties scoring 6 or 7. The question is available in the period 1999–2014.
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Figure 6: Scatter plot by type of party
On the vertical axis, we plot the country-level 5-year average of the dependent variable (DiffEU-Nat) for Eurosceptic(moderate) parties
on left(right) side. Moderate includes all parties not classified as Eurosceptic. On the horizontal axis, the figure shows the net transfers
as % of GNI similarly to Figure Fig. 4.
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Our aim is to better understand the behaviour of individuals who have voted for a Eurosceptic
party at the last EU parliamentary elections (26th May 2019) and for a moderate party at
the most recent national/subnational elections. This is an ideal group of voters to investigate
why individuals might vote for different parties at different elections.
Our final sample includes 341 such respondents: 51 from Finland, 209 from France and
81 from the Italian region of Piedmont.40 The choice of areas where to run the survey was
made taking into account the time lag between European and national/subnational elections.
While the election of the European Parliament took place on 26th May 2019 in all three areas,
at the national/subnational level we registered voting behaviour for the Finnish Parliament
(14th April 2019) and President (28th January 2018), the French Parliament (11th June 2017)
and President (23rd April 2017) and, in the case of Italy, the Piedmontese Parliament, whose
elections took place on the same day as the European Parliament elections (26th May 2019),
hence, our Italian respondents voted simultaneously for both European and regional elections
and, yet, they voted for different parties.
We first screened respondents by asking for which party they voted at the above mentioned
elections. Individuals were selected only if they split their vote, by choosing a Eurosceptic
party at the EU elections and a moderate party at least in one of the other elections. The
survey continued with some additional questions, aimed at understanding why they cast their
vote in favour of a Eurosceptic party only at the European elections.
Specifically, we asked them how much they agreed with the following statements on a
scale from 1 (fully disagree) to 7 (fully agree):
1. whether the Eurosceptic party they voted will be able to better:
a) protect the interests of their country at the European Level
b) attract more European funds to their country
c) lead their country out of the European Union
2. whether they voted the Eurosceptic party to express their discontent with the current
national government and/or president.
Questions 1a) and 1b) are aimed at capturing our mechanism, i.e. the idea that voters might
strategically vote for Eurosceptic parties only at the EU level, since they expect a better
deal for their member state in all kinds of EU level negotiations by electing them. Questions
1c) and 2) are intended to capture alternative reasons for voting for such parties only at the
40The relatively small sample size is due to the effort in selecting individuals with such specific voting
requirements.
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EU level. Furthermore, for each of the voted parties, we asked which party represents them
better, as compared to other parties. The order of questions was randomised.
Finally, we collected the answers to a set of standard demographic questions and a few
questions on media use and interest in politics. The survey, whose duration was approximately
10 minutes, was translated in the national language. We coded Eurosceptic and moderate
parties based on the same methodology of the previous section.
We report the results in Fig. 7. The figure shows the average support for each statement
across countries and levels of political interest (low and high). We highlight this cleavage, as it
appears the only one along which preferences seem to consistently change across individuals.41
The first four bars of each graph represent the above four options. The fifth grey bar in
each graph represents the difference in support between the voted Eurosceptic and the voted
moderate party(ies). Positive (negative) values imply higher support for the Eurosceptic
(moderate) party(ies).
Overall, we find that strategic reasons seem to matter to explain such voting behaviours.
This is true both if we conceptualise it in abstract terms (protecting the national interest)
or in more concrete terms (attracting EU funds). This is specifically true for Finland and
Italy and for voters highly interested in politics in France. Unsurprisingly, also the other
two options seem to matter, i.e. wanting to leave the EU and expressing discontent with
the national government. This is not undermining our reasoning, as we are not arguing that
strategic reasons are the only ones leading voters to vote for different parties depending on the
level of government. Instead, our results highlight that strategic voting plays an important
and complementary role in this decision-making process. The fifth bar in each graph shows
no big differences in support across the voted Eurosceptic/moderate parties. This validates
the idea that, on average, voters do not systematically feel closer to a specific party. Finally,
across all countries, individuals more interested in politics show higher preferences for the
motivations linked to strategic voting (p-value<0.001): such sophisticated voting behaviour
is indeed typical of voters more involved in the political arena and its discourse.
41Specifically, we consider as having a high political interest, those individuals replying 4 or above on a scale
from 0 to 7. Conversely, we do not find any heterogeneity across other dimensions, as gender, age, education,
job status and media consumption.
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Figure 7: Online Survey results
The figure shows the distributions of replies across countries and levels of political interest.
5 Final remarks
Incentives play a major role when it comes to economic decision-making, as a badly designed
incentive scheme may lead to undesired outcomes. This paper shows that in a multi-tiered
country – as well as in a union of countries such as the EU – the presence of interregional
redistribution can bring about political extremism at higher levels of government, for strategic
reasons.
When voters are sophisticated, they anticipate the bargaining process that leads to the
concession of federal support. Proposition 1 shows that they manipulate their choice in order
to move the bargaining point in a more favourable direction. To do that, they vote for federal
candidates that have more extremely protective preferences than their own. In other words,
median voters in each region willingly elect delegates with preferences that are more extreme
than their own. This is a strategic choice, reflected by the preference type of the elected
federal representatives. Net receiving regions will elect delegates which are more likely to
support lower-level governments with their policies, whilst net contributors are more likely to
32
elect representatives in favour of less federal intervention.
Such behaviour has direct and testable consequences on the level of polarisation and
extremism. Our empirical analysis (Section 3) – consistent with the model’s predictions
– shows that citizens in the European Union have voted for more nationalist/protectionist
parties in EU elections than they did for their own national elections. This strategic effect
arises only for net receiving and net contributing member states, but not in countries where
EU contributions and expenditures are more or less balanced.
Distortions come at a cost, which can range from the economic cost of over- or under pro-
vision to the the psychological cost of voters electing politicians they (ideologically) disagree
with. Yet also the broader societal cost of political instability is relevant here, as populist
polarisation can lead to intensification of conflict and even the potential break-up of the fed-
eration. A relevant question then becomes how a federation could prevent this outcome, and
mitigate the costs. Our recommendation here would be to break – or at least weaken – the
regional ties of federal politicians by introducing a unique electoral district, possibly com-
bined with a wider use of direct democracy and presidentialism. This way federally elected
politicians will have an incentive to design policies which benefit the entire federation, and
not just their own constituency. The channel of strategic voting we describe in our model is
shut down as a result.
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Appendix A Three-region setting
We extend here the analysis by adding one region to the federal constellation studied above:
|R| = 3. We focus on the case when a coalition of two forms: |K| = 2.42 We abstract from
the discussion or formal analysis of why a given coalition forms between two of the three
regions.43 Following the previous notation and without loss of generality K = {α, β} ⊂ R.
Furthermore, we denote by z ∈ R\K the region that is not represented in the coalition.
We focus on the case in which the coalition is formed by a contributor and a recipient,44
and neglect the trivial case of a coalition of regions of the same kind, which inevitably leads
to a corner equilibrium.45 By construction, if the two regions in the coalition are of opposite
type, one of them must be of the same type as region z.















c (Ck) + θ̂kx (Gk, Xk)− Fk
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, (19)
and the first order condition is:
φ3f = 0,
with φ3f ≡ ωαθ̂α∆αx′2 (Gα, Xα) + ωβ θ̂β∆βx′2 (Gβ, Xβ) .
(20)
Eq. (20) is the counterpart of Eq. (9). The main difference between them is that with two
regions ∆α = −∆β while in the 3-region case ∆α = −∆β −∆z.
Proposition 3 compares the choice γ of the federal government in the case of two and three
regions (respectively |R| = 2 and |R| = 3). For that, denote by γR the equilibrium magnitude
of the federal policy with R regions.
Proposition 3. When the region excluded from the coalition (z) benefits from the federal
policy (∆z > 0), the implemented policy is more generous with two regions (γ
2 > γ3). The
opposite (γ2 < γ3) is true when the region excluded looses from the federal policy (∆z < 0).
The federal decision is taken by representatives with opposing interests, yet decisions are
taken in a cooperative way. With three regions, the interest of only two regions is defended
42The analysis of the equilibrium when the grand coalition forms is isomorphic to what we observe with
|R| = 2 and its study does not bring new insights.
43We briefly come back to this point in appendices B and C, where we test the robustness of our model
against that.
44Region z, despite being left outside the coalition, is part of the federal state and as such they participate
in the process of collection and redistribution of federal taxes even if they are not participating to the federal
decision process.
45When both regions in the coalition are recipients, they set the largest possible federal policy and extract
all surplus from the excluded region. When both regions are contributors, they repeal the policy and set it to
the lowest possible level.
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within the federal government. This leads to the result behind Proposition 3. When the
benefits of the policy are shared with the excluded region, the federal government only inter-
nalises part of them, which leads to a relatively smaller policy γ2 > γ3. Similarly, if the cost
of the policy is shared with excluded region ((∆z < 0), but not internalised, then the size of
the federal policy is relatively larger γ3 > γ2.
Despite not being part of the federal coalition, region z has an (indirect) effect on the
equilibrium policy γ. Lemma 4 shows how and when it happens.46
Lemma 4. When region z (the one out of the coalition) looses from the policy (∆z < 0), the





) is larger in
the 3-region setting than in the 2-region one. Conversely, when z benefits from the policy the
marginal effect is smaller.
Proof. See Appendix D.
When moving to local elections, it is immediate to notice that voting in the region that
is excluded from the coalition (z) acts as if there were no federal government (which, as
previously discussed, corresponds to the myopic case). Hence c′(Cz) − θmz x′1 (Gz, Xz) = 0.
Eqs. (21) to (22) implicitly define the preferences of the median voter in region α, in terms































) = 2ηα(θ̂α − θmα )
θmα
. (22)
Proposition 4. When region k’s interest is aligned with the one of the excluded region (that
is, when sgn(∆k) = sgn(∆z)), their mark-up (µ(θk)) is smaller in the 3-region case than with
2 regions. Conversely, if region k’s interest is opposite to the one of the excluded region (that
is, when sgn(∆k) 6= sgn(∆z)), their mark-up (µ(θk)) is larger in the 3-region case than with
2 regions.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 4 describes the level of distortion (mark-up) in region k by comparing the
type of the region (∆k) with the type of the region excluded from the coalition (∆z).
46For a graphical representation, see Fig. 1 at Page 17.
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Notice that when region α is aligned with z, then (∆α)
2
(∆β)




2 > 1 when α









2 < 1, mark-up µ(θα) is smaller in the 3-region case and
µ(θβ) is larger, hence the ratio µ(θα)/µ(θβ) decreases.
The mechanism behind this result is that the region outside the coalition is either sharing
the cost or the benefit with one of the regions in the coalition. This changes the marginal
incentive to negotiate within the coalition, as pointed out by Lemma 4.
Figs. 8 to 10 represent the content of Proposition 4 by showing when (∆α)
2
(∆β)
























Figure 8: Distortion of θ̂α in the (β − z) space
White areas represent combinations of ∆r such that regions α and z are both of the same
type (recipient or contributor) and therefore the distortion of θ̂α is smaller in the 3-region
setting. Conversely grey areas represent combinations of ∆r such that regions α and z are
of opposite type and therefore the distortion of θ̂α is larger in the 3-region setting. Striped
areas indicate combinations of ∆r that are incompatible with the assumption
∑
r ∆r = 0.
Figs. 8 and 9 mirror each other. This is because by construction sgn(∆α) = − sgn(∆β).
Fig. 10 allows to identify in the ∆α,∆β space which are the areas (white) in which α and z















































Figure 10: Distortion of θ̂α in the (α− β) space
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Appendix B Strategic Behaviour and Beliefs
Until now we assumed that elected delegates have a certain say in federal negotiations, and
that agents are fully rational, in the sense that they perfectly understand the institutional
setting and act strategically, thus taking advantage of the system as much as possible. We
could relax both assumptions by assuming that agents assign a region-specific probability pk
to the fact that their elected politician will be able to impact federal policy-making, and thus
the federal policy intensity γ as previously described, whereas with probability 1 − pk they
will not influence the federal government’s decisions at all. In this latter case the federal
policy will consequently be exogenously set at γ̂.47
There can be several ways to rationalise such beliefs. Voters may think – or correctly anti-
cipate – that 1−pk is the probability that a coalition forms, but with their own representative
kept out of the formation process.48 Another possibility could be that voters believe the fed-
eral government has not full discretion over γ and with some probability another (possibly
not directly elected) institution controls it. One more option could be that voters believe the
political weight of their region within the coalition is such that their politician is not able to
influence γ, or at least to a lesser degree. In this sense, voters are incorrectly anticipating ω,
so that probabilities pk express the perceived political weight of a representative, rather than
the actual weight. This could be the case when their own politicians are less ideally positioned
to pull the levers of policy-making because they have less insight in the various practices and
rules involved. It could also be that the latter are perceived as potentially stacked in favour
of other representatives enjoying more leverage when the rules are set. Lastly, the general
opinion could be that once regional representatives are part of the national, higher-level es-
tablishment, they will lose interest in their own region, or will be pushed to do so.49 Clearly,
one may think that pk – as interpreted above – could also vary through time in a more gen-
eral dynamic setting. In order to keep our robustness check in this section distinct and clear,
however, we keep the model static and study how results change when pk varies.
Conditional on the politician being able to influence γ, and still solving backwards, results
from period 2 in Section 2.1.1 go through in our extended setting here, as voter beliefs do
not directly affect actual federal decision-making. However, and moving to period 1 when the
federal representatives are elected, the maximisation problem of the median voter in region
47Notice that at this point it does not matter whether these beliefs originate from voters not fully under-
standing the game at play, or whether they correctly anticipate that the local politician will not always have
a say on the decision of γ.
48We work out this micro-foundation of beliefs in Appendix C, where voters have to make conjectures for
the likelihood of their representative being the formateur, who shapes the federal minimum winning coalition.
We show that all possible combinations collapse into a formulation where pk relates to endogenous federal
decision-making and 1− pk to a setting where γ is exogenously set (γ̂).
49See e.g. Thorlakson (2009) and the references therein.
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k ∈ K now includes the additional constraint that γ is defined by Eq. (9) with probability pk,
and γ = γ̂ with probability 1− pk. Here then, Lemma 3 translates into the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Eqs. (23) to (24) implicitly define the preferences of the median voter in region
α, in terms of the local tax tα (Eq. (23)) and of the representative selected to join the federal
legislature θ̂α (Eq. (24)).
pk
x′1 (Gα, Xα(γ))− ωαθ̂αx′2 (Gα, Xα(γ))x′′1,2 (Gα, Xα(γ))(









−pkωα (x′2 (Gα, Xα(γ)))
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ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, Xα(γ)) + ωβ θ̂βx
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2,2 (Gβ, Xβ(γ))




From Lemma 5, we immediately obtain that Proposition 1 still holds. Eq. (24) is identical
to Eq. (14), with the exception that the left hand side of Eq. (24) is multiplied by pk ∈ [0, 1],
from which we immediately conclude that the equilibrium distortion of θk is lower in this
case. This result is quite intuitive, since now agents expect the strategic mechanism to be at
work only with probability pk, so that they have less reason to manipulate the federal vote,
and reduce distortion as a result. Comparing these distortion across regions subsequently, we
obtain Corollary 3. This is the equivalent of Corollary 1, but then in the more general setting
allowing for varying voter beliefs.
Corollary 3. The strategic voting of the median voter – assigning beliefs to the effectiveness











Corollary 3 sheds more light on how beliefs captured by pk affect our previous results.
The more representatives of a certain region are seen as being influential as compared to
another, the more voters will distort federal elections in that region. In other words, the more
pronounced the beliefs captured by pα as compared to pβ, the higher the relative mark-up of
distortion µ(θα)µ(θβ) in Corollary 3.
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Appendix C Coalition formation
In this section, we add some structure to the 3-region setting of Appendix A, by looking
deeper into how a coalition forms. The aim of this extension is twofold. First, we provide
a plausible foundation for the 3-region setting in Section A, where coalition formation was
taken for granted and treated as a black box. Second, we link this section to Section B, where
voters anticipate that with some probability the their representative has no direct impact
on federal decision making. Indeed, in what follows voters are put in a similar position of
uncertainty, as they cannot be sure their own representative will be part of the coalition.
We keep restricting our focus to the minimum-winning coalition, so that |R| = 3 and
|K| = 2. This to demonstrate that equilibria where a coalition of two forms, are indeed
admissible in our setting. Also, whenever a grand-coalition were to form results would be
isomorphic to the 2-region setting studied in Section 2.1, hence we would gain little insight by
studying such an event. The only difference with respect to Section A, therefore, is that we
introduce one additional step between federal elections and the decision over γ: a “formateur”
is randomly selected amongst representatives, and is asked to choose a partner to form the
federal government. Once this coalition is formed, the representatives of the two regions act
cooperatively, as before, and select the federal tax that maximises their joint utility.50 This
sequential structure, with a formateur choosing first who to form a coalition with and then the
terms of the bargaining, is quite common. One notable exception would be Talamàs (2020),
where agents simultaneously bargain on who will be part of the coalitions and on its terms.
We show that, with some probability, the federal decision responds directly to the pref-
erences θ̂k of strategically elected representatives, which is the channel upon which the main
model is built. With the complementary probability, federal decisions do not lend themselves
to strategic motives. Hence, results are in line with our previous claim that voters act stra-
tegically when it comes to the choice of who is going to represent them at the federal level, as
long as they believe the latter will – to a certain extent – be influential in setting γ. Indeed,
the more structured model developed here micro-founds one of the interpretations considered
in Appendix B, where beliefs were precisely shaped by the probability assigned to the event
of being included in the federal coalition.
The timing of the game, hence, becomes the following. In period 1, citizens vote over
the local tax tr and elect the delegate θ̂r to potentially join the federal government. Then, a
formateur is randomly selected: each delegate θ̂r has the same probability
1
3 to be selected. To
ensure a majority, it suffices for the formateur to choose just one coalition partner. Once this
partner is selected, the bargaining process is the same as in Sections A and 2.1, with coalition
50The bargaining power of the formateur within the coalition may vary substantially depending on the
bargaining system (Ali et al., 2018). Weight (ωk) in our model could account for that.
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members cooperatively seeking to maximise joint surplus against the threat of negotiations
breaking down.
The type of a region depends on whether it is a contributor or a recipient. Hence, with
three regions, it must be that two of them are always of the same type, while the third one
is of the opposite one. Regions’ type is common knowledge. Hence, at the moment of the
vote, citizens know if they are voting in the region of “unique type” or “non-unique type”,
i.e. whether there is another region of the same type in the federation. We solve those two
cases separately, respectively in Sections C.1 and C.2. In both cases, we show that median
voters will be driven to choose the federal representative θ̂ strategically, leading to federal
representatives with stronger preferences for consumption in period 2. However, this driving
force is mitigated by another one which goes in the opposite direction, and leads to select the
median voter as the representative at the federal level. Voters’ behaviour will ultimately be
the result of a weighted average of the two forces, as depicted (in reduced form) in Appendix
B.
We already argued in Section A that a coalition of two regions of a kind allows members
to expropriate the left-out region. When both regions in the coalition are net recipients, they
set the largest possible federal policy (γ = γ) and extract all surplus from the excluded region.
If both regions are net contributors, they repeal the policy and set it at the lowest possible
level (γ = γ).51 In both cases we arrive at a corner solution, over which voters in the excluded
region will have no control. Therefore, when the formateur is of the “non-unique type”, their
optimal strategy is always to form a coalition with the other region of identical type.
However, a formateur of the “unique type” will have no alternative but to form a coalition
with a representative of a region of the opposite type. In this case, the best strategy is to
form a coalition with the representative with the smallest θ̂. The formateur’s preference to
form a coalition with the smallest θ̂ is anticipated by voters and will be reflected in their
choice of the representative they elect. The details about this follow below.
C.1 Unique type
In this section, we consider the case in which the region’s type is opposite to the type of
the two other regions. Consider first the possibility that voters’ representative is not the
formateur, with probability 23 . Here then, following the previous argument, the two other
regions form a coalition together and expropriate the region of interest, by choosing federal
tax γ /E . Utility of the median voter in region r then becomes
Umr (γ












51Clearly, if there are constitutional bounds to the acceptable tax rates, the coalition would opt for these,
instead of 0 and 1.
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Notice that delegates will have no say over federal spending and, therefore, utility is maximised
when θ̂r = θ
m
r . That is, when the median voter elects a representative with their own same
preferences.
With the complementary probability 13 , the representative is the formateur. Hence, by
construction, they are part of the coalition and select, as a partner, the representative with the
lowest θ̂. In such a case, the two members of the coalition have opposite goals. Expropriating
the region outside of the coalition is no longer an option, so they maximise joint surplus as
in Section A.52 In a sense coalition partners try to mitigate each other’s objectives. The
federal tax rate is the result of the weighted utilitarian bargaining solution and we denote it
by γ3(θ̂k), with






c (Ck) + θ̂kx (Gk, Xk(γ))− Fk
)
. (27)
The median voter’s utility in this case is:
Umr (γ












Hence, when electing the federal representative by maximising Eq. (28), the motive to vote
strategically for voters in region r reappears, and is the same as in Section A. Indeed, their
delegate will now have a clear say over federal spending.
Combining Eq. (26) and Eq. (28) subsequently, and given the probability of becoming the















Cr = (1− tr)Yr, (30)
Gr = trYr. (31)
Eq. (29) simplifies to
max
tr,θ̂r





















which is the isomorphic equivalent of Eq. (61), and consequently also serves as a first example
of a possible micro-foundation for the more general case developed in Appendix B.
52More specifically, the setting for the formateur region is isomorphic to the case when α and z are of the
opposite type, while for the region that is not the formateur, the setting corresponds to the one in which α
and z are of the same type.
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C.2 Not-unique type
Consider now the case in which region r is of a given type and there exists another region of
the same type. This brings about three, equally likely, possibilities:
1. The representative of region r becomes the formateur. In this case, the formateur
forms a coalition with the representative from the region of identical type. Together
they “expropriate” the region that is left out of the coalition. This leads to a corner
solution, similarly to the previous case of expropriation: the only difference is that now
our region of interest is the one expropriating. Yet, by choosing a corner solution to
expropriate, the choice of γ does not depend on the type θ̂r that the region selects
to operate within the federal government. Hence, in this setting, there is no need for
strategic manipulation by voters, as their delegate will always get to fully expropriate
the region outside of the coalition. We denote the resulting federal tax by γE , where
the expropriating policy corresponds to the constitutional boundary for federal policy.
In such case, the utility of the median voter in region r is:
Umr (γ












2. The formateur is the representative of the region of the same type as our region of
interest. Such situation mirrors the previous one. The one region of the same type as
our region of interest will invite the region of interest to form a coalition, and together
they again expropriate the region left out of the coalition. Once again, voters in region r
have no reason to vote strategically, since their delegate always gets to fully expropriate
the region outside of the coalition. Eq. (33) is again the utility of the median voter in
our region of interest.
3. The formateur is the representative of the unique-type region, hence of the type opposite
to our region of interest. Inevitably, the coalition members must have opposing goals.
A priori, both regions could be selected by the formateur, yet the formateur has a clear
incentive to face the weakest possible opponent, who is represented by the lowest θ̂. The
two regions may compete to be part of the coalition, however, competition is limited
by the fact that both regions pursue a common goal: to preserve the interests of their
(common) type. The benefit of sitting at the table with the formateur is intrinsically
determined by the fact of preserving their utility. There is no ulterior motive to be
part of the coalition. As such, compared to a standard competition “à la Bertrand”,
behaviour is more strategic, which we analyse in the remainder of this section. For now,
assume that a representative of type θ is selected to form a coalition. Negotiations will
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proceed as before, by maximising joint utility, so that the resulting federal tax γ3(θ̂φ, θ)
is defined as









c (Ck) + θkx (Gr, Xr(γ))− Fk
)
(34)
where subscript φ denotes the formateur.
Denote by i = {1, 2} the two regions that are of the same kind. Then their maximisation




















Ci = (1− ti)Yi, (36)
Gi = tiYi, (37)

























































Proposition 5. When regions 1 and 2 are of the same type, the unique equilibrium for the
median voters in both regions is to act strategically and elect θ̂i = max{θmi ; min{θ1; θ2}},
where i = {1, 2} and θ1 and θ2 are defined by Eq. (39).
Proof. See Section D
When a region is of a not-unique type – that is, the region is a net contributor and
there exists another contributing region, or the region is a net recipient and there exists
another receiving region – two alternatives may materialise, depending on whether or not
max{θm1 ; θm2 } < min{θ1; θ2}.
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Proposition 5 shows that, if θmi ≥ min{θ1; θ2}, the elected candidate in region i = {1, 2} is
θ̂i = θ
m
i , hence median voters are acting in a non-strategic way, by selecting a representative of
their own type. However, this can only occur in one region at the time, because the condition
θmi ≥ min{θ1; θ2} cannot be verified simultaneously for both regions. Furthermore, it can
only materialise for the region that is left out of the coalition whenever the formateur is of
the unique, opposite type.
If θmi < min{θ1; θ2}, instead, the elected candidate in region i is θ̂i = min{θ1; θ2}. The
existence condition can hold for both regions simultaneously, and it always holds for the region
that belongs to the coalition when the formateur is of the unique, opposite type. In such a
region, the median voter chooses to distort the type of the elected candidate, by selecting a
type θ̂i > θ
m
i .
As in Section C.1, this equilibrium setting belongs to the family of equilibria described in
Appendix B, where the median voter maximises a weighted sum of one element for which the
federal tax is orthogonal to the identity of the regional representative and another element
for which, instead, the federal tax depends on the identity of the regional representative.
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Appendix D Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. The federal optimisation problem set out in Section 2.1.1


















Ck = (1− tk)Yk, (41)
Gk = tkYk, (42)
Xk = P (γ)∆k. (43)
so that we get the following first order condition
ωαθ̂α∆αP
′(γ)x′2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂β∆βP
′(γ)x′2 (Gβ, P (γ)∆β) = 0. (44)
Since ∆β = −∆α, it follows that
φf ≡ ωαθ̂αx′2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)− ωβ θ̂βx′2 (Gβ, P (γ)∆β) = 0. (45)











2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′




Taking into account that x′′2,2(·) < 0, while ωk, θ̂k, Yk, x′2(·) and P ′(γ) are all positive, the

















1,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′















1,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
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Proof of Lemma 3. The optimisation problem of the median voter in region k ∈ K set out
in Section 2.1.2 can be summed up as
max
tk,θ̂k
Uk = c (Ck) + θ
m





subject to Eq. (45) and
Ck = (1− tk)Yk (50)
Gk = tkYk (51)
so that we get the following first order condition for tk








which, using Eq. (48) for k = α yields










1 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)−θmα
ωαθ̂αx
′
2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)x
′′
1,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α)(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′
2,2 (Gβ, P (γ)∆β)
) = c′(Cα). (54)
For θ̂k, we obtain the following first order condition
θmk x
′







− 2ηk(θ̂k − θmk ) = 0, (55)




2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α))
2(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′
2,2 (Gβ, P (γ)∆β)
) = 2ηα(θ̂α − θmα ). (56)
Proof of Proposition 1 and its corollary. The first order condition with respect to θ̂k,




− 2ηk(θ̂k − θmk ) = 0.







Hence, for an equilibrium to exist, we must have that θ̂k = θ
m
k , so that the elected federal
representative and the median voter will have identical preferences for the public policy. As
a result, there will be no strategic voting.
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As long as ∆k 6= 0, rewriting Eq. (56), we obtain
−ωα (x′2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α))
2(
ωαθ̂αx′′2,2 (Gα, P (γ)∆α) + ωβ θ̂βx
′′
2,2 (Gβ, P (γ)∆β)
) = 2ηα(θ̂α − θmα )
θmα
, (58)
Since x′′2,2 (Gk, P (γ)∆k) < 0, the left-hand side is always positive and hence a solution can
only exist if θ̂k > θ
m
k . Hence, in equilibrium, the elected federal representative will always
have a weakly stronger taste for the public policy that the median voter.
Finally, Eq. (15) is simply obtained by combining Eq. (58) computed respectively for
region α and β.
ωα (x
′










Proof of Proposition 2 and its corollary. We look at different behaviours (or levels of
sophistication) of the median voter in one region, keeping everything else equal. This means
that, focusing on the median voter in region α, we assume that choices in region β are given,
with local representative being θ̂β.
The left hand side is the same in the three equations and is increasing in tα. The right
hand side can be ranked as follow:
• Rs > Rn > Rm = 0 when x′′1,2 > 0,
• 0 = Rm > Rn > Rs when x′′1,2 < 0,
where Rs, Rn, Rm are the right hand side respectively for sophisticated, naive and myopic
voters.













α if and only if x
′′
1,2 < 0.









2 (Gβ, Xβ) ∆z (60)
The proof is organised as follows:
1. We first study the sign of the right hand side of the equation.
2. Then we show that the left hand side is zero when γ is set at the two-region equilibrium
level.
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3. Finally, we show that the left hand side is decreasing in γ.
With these information at our disposal, we will be able to conclude the proof.
1. Since ωβ θ̂βx
′
2 (Gβ, Xβ) is always positive, the sign of the right hand side coincides with
the sign of ∆z.




2 (Gα, Xα)− ωβ θ̂βx′2 (Gβ, Xβ)
)
corres-
ponds to φf in Eq. (9) and, hence, it’s by construction equal to 0 for γ = γ
2, that is, when






′(γ)∆2α − ωβ θ̂βx′′2,2 (Gβ, Xβ)P ′(γ)∆α∆β. Notice that the
first term is always negative, because by assumption x′′2,2 (Gα, Xα). The second term has
three negative components: the initial − sign, x′′2,2 (Gβ, Xβ) and ∆α∆β, where the latter is
negative because the two terms have always opposite sign. Hence,
∂∆αφf
∂γ < 0.
If we evaluate Eq. (60) at γ = γ2, the left hand side would be 0. The right hand side has
the same sign as ∆z. Because the left hand side is decreasing in γ, if ∆z > 0, for the left
hand side to be positive we need γ3 < γ2. If, instead, ∆z < 0, for the left hand side to be
negative we need γ3 > γ2.
Proof of Lemma 4. We use here, again, the notation γ2 and γ3 to refer to the equilibrium





















































Without loss of generality, we assume that k = α and solve separately for ∆α > 0 and
∆α < 0.






k ∆k = 0, the condition is
satisfied if and only if ∆z < 0.






k ∆k = 0, the condition is
satisfied if and only if ∆z < 0.
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) > − ωα (x′2 (Gα, Xα))2(








We already know that the condition is satisfied if and only if sgn(∆α) 6= sgn(∆z).
Proof of Lemma 5. The maximisation problem of the median voter in region k ∈ K set
out in appendix B can be summed up as
max
tk,θ̂k
Uk = c (Ck) + pkθ
m
k x (Gk, Xk(γ











Ck = tkYk (63)
where we use γ∗ to denote the federal tax implicitly defined by Eq. (9), in order to distinguish
it from γ̂, which represents the federal tax when exogenously set.
















which, using Eq. (10) for k = α yields Eq. (23).













− 2ηk(θ̂k − θmk ) = 0, (65)
which, using Eq. (12) for k = α yields Eq. (24).
Proof of Proposition 5. From the first order condition, it immediately follows that the





= 0, and this is true if and only if region i is not part
of the coalition.
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Note that (median) voters are aware of the importance of their choice of θ̂i, in that it will
determine whether their region is part of the coalition when the formateur represents a region
of the unique type (i.e. the opposite type compared to both their types).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that θ1 < θ2. Then, by Proposition 1, either we have
max{θm1 ; θm2 } < θ1 < θ2, or θm1 < θ1 < θm2 < θ2. Finally, notice that, for each region i,
preferences are single-peaked around:
• θi, conditional on being part of the coalition,
• θmi , conditional on being left out of the coalition.
Start from a candidate equilibrium in which region 1 chooses θ̂1 = θ1. Then region 2 will
be left out of the coalition for any θ̂2 > θ1, in which case, conditional on remaining out of
the coalition, the best response will always be to select θ̂2 to be as close as possible to θ
m
2 .




2 > θ1. However, if θ
m
2 ≤ θ1, the median voter in region 2
may choose θ̂2 = θ1 and remain out of the coalition, or may decide to undercut and choose
θ̂2 < θ1, in order to get closer to θ
m
2 . However, by doing so, region 2 would become part of
the coalition, in which case they would want to move as close as possible to θ2, which implies
to increase θ̂2, and they can do so up to θ̂2 = θ1. Consequently, any deviation above or below
θ1 is not profitable.
Suppose, instead, that we start from a candidate equilibrium in which region 2 chooses
θ̂2 = θ2. Then region 1 will be left out of the coalition for any θ̂1 > θ2. In such cases,
conditional on remaining out of the coalition, the best response will always be to select θ̂1 to
be as close as possible to θm1 . This implies choosing θ̂1 = θ2 (remember that θ
m
1 < θ1 < θ2).
Suppose that region 1 decides to move further close to θm1 , the moment they move below θ2,
region 1 is selected to form the coalition and will as a result want to move as close as possible
to θ1. Because θ̂2 = θ2, then region 1 can choose θ̂1 = θ1 and be part of the coalition, which is
what is optimal for them. Then region 1 will choose θ̂1 = θ1 and we are back to the situation
previously analysed, where we showed that region 2 will choose θ̂2 =
{







this concludes the proof.
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Appendix E Additional Empirical Results
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
DiffEU-Nat -0.307 5.117 1138
DiffEU-Nat (Winsorized .01) -0.324 4.618 1138
Eurosceptic 0.166 0.372 1138
Extreme 0.129 0.336 1138
Diff Turnout 21.253 13.952 1135
Party Size 9.096 10.942 1138
Incumbent 0.095 0.293 1138
% Net Contribution/GNI (2000-2015) 0.668 1.188 1138
Net Contribution Absolute Values (2000-2015) (Billion Euros) -0.62 3.756 1138
Cube Rule 1.104 0.157 1130
Variable 10-year window Mean Std. Dev. N
DiffEU-Nat -0.111 3.888 542
Eurosceptic 0.166 0.372 542
Party Size 7.746 10.508 542
Incumbent 0.142 0.349 542
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Figure 11: Differences in Voting between EU and National Elections across Pro-Europe and
Eurosceptic Parties: 10-year window
The figure shows the distributions of votes for parties at European and at National elections in the period 1990-2013, differentiating
between Eurosceptic and not-Eurosceptic parties. The analysis is based on a 10-year window.
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Table 5: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections: Winsorized Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.751*** 1.774*** 1.840*** 1.604*** 2.098** 2.129*** 2.459*** 1.981**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.340** -2.349** -2.715*** -2.309**
(0.889) (0.884) (0.946) (1.004)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 1.069 1.043 0.489 1.054
(1.054) (1.043) (1.175) (1.232)
Diff Turnout -0.0120 -0.0105 0.00539 -0.0133 -0.0114 0.00586
(0.00864) (0.00883) (0.0125) (0.00910) (0.00916) (0.0126)
Cube Law 0.573 0.624 0.515 0.579
(0.896) (0.871) (0.953) (0.923)




Observations 1,128 1,128 1,136 1,140 1,128 1,128 1,136 1,140
R-squared 0.021 0.023 0.046 0.134 0.031 0.034 0.056 0.143
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections winsorized at 1% level); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic
parties; Party Size is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent
party; Cube Rule is index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout
between national and European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU
budget. The omitted category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections: alternative 5-year period definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.241** 1.255** 1.424** 1.223** 1.755* 1.780* 2.042** 1.693**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.058* -2.058* -2.252* -2.069*
(1.080) (1.093) (1.140) (1.193)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 0.118 0.0839 0.00755 0.478
(1.178) (1.185) (1.291) (1.259)
Diff Turnout -0.00376 -0.00393 0.00919 -0.00518 -0.00455 0.00960
(0.00745) (0.00767) (0.0101) (0.00727) (0.00756) (0.0101)
Cube Law 0.345 0.391 0.338 0.411
(0.726) (0.734) (0.752) (0.768)




Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148
R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.031 0.114 0.018 0.020 0.037 0.120
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule is an
index capturing the degree of proportionality of the electoral system; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles splits countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections: 10-year time window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.322** 1.314** 1.368** 1.398** 1.669** 1.621** 1.878** 1.891**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.143** -2.094** -2.271** -2.366*
(0.982) (1.000) (1.082) (1.169)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 0.838 0.917 0.381 0.639
(0.921) (0.927) (1.143) (1.206)
Diff Turnout -0.00567 -0.00658 0.0143 -0.00825 -0.00910 0.0140
(0.00693) (0.00746) (0.0111) (0.00781) (0.00854) (0.0110)
Cube Law -0.593 -0.592 -0.683 -0.712
(0.669) (0.681) (0.714) (0.745)




Observations 826 826 837 840 826 826 837 840
R-squared 0.015 0.017 0.045 0.111 0.028 0.029 0.054 0.121
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule
is index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections controlling for Radical parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.757** 1.786** 2.130** 2.419** 2.134** 2.167** 2.710** 2.738**





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -2.489** -2.502** -2.876** -2.341**
(1.014) (1.016) (1.068) (1.072)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 1.065 1.039 0.671 1.454
(1.246) (1.248) (1.444) (1.492)
Radical 0.152 0.144 -0.153 -0.855 0.167 0.165 -0.0982 -0.886
(0.806) (0.818) (0.932) (1.215) (0.871) (0.885) (1.054) (1.313)
Diff Turnout -0.0127 -0.0119 0.00838 -0.0134 -0.0120 0.00888
(0.00967) (0.00981) (0.0136) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0137)
Cube Law 0.427 0.481 0.398 0.467
(0.945) (0.922) (1.014) (0.989)




Observations 1,128 1,128 1,136 1,140 1,128 1,128 1,136 1,140
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.042 0.129 0.029 0.032 0.051 0.138
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule
is index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). Radical is a dummy set equal to 1 for radical left/right parties. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections – Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 2.281** 2.263** 2.155** 2.781* 1.603* 1.568* 1.187 1.657





Eurosceptic*2ndtertile -1.213 -1.170 -1.576 -1.483
(1.425) (1.440) (1.377) (1.779)
Eurosceptic*3rdtertile 3.385 3.406 4.362* 5.704**
(2.081) (2.132) (2.378) (2.595)
Diff Turnout 0.0204 0.0170 0.0597 0.0320 0.0278 0.0559
(0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0461) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0456)
Cube Law -0.795 -0.872 -1.129 -1.194
(1.264) (1.253) (1.549) (1.547)




Observations 314 314 314 315 314 314 314 315
R-squared 0.046 0.051 0.124 0.435 0.081 0.086 0.156 0.479
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); tha sample is restricted only to strongly pro/anti EU parties. Eurosceptic
is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy
set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule is an index capturing the degree of proportionality of the electoral system; Diff
Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national and European elections. Tertiles splits countries in three groups based on
their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
58
Appendix F Additional Empirical Results II: A Bigger Fed-
eration
EU integration was a staggered process which started out from a small set of just six countries,
to end up 60 years later as a union of 28 member states. This evolution can be interpreted
in the light of Section B, where we investigate the potential role of beliefs over political
effectiveness. More specifically, we allowed agents to assign region-specific probabilities to
the fact that their elected politician will be able to impact federal policy-making in a certain
period, which in turn affects the intensity of their strategic behaviour. This could occur
when voters believe the political weight of their region – within the federal coalition – is
such that their politician is more, or less, able to influence federal redistribution. Another
possibility would be when voters perceive the chances to be included in the ruling coalition
as becoming slimmer, the more the set of member states expands. Applied to our setting of
EU enlargement, both interpretations imply that voters will behave less strategically since
they expect the influence of their representatives to decline. However, it could also be that
EU political processes are perceived as potentially stacked in favour of the initial member
states, as they enjoyed quite some leverage when the initial rules were set. Knowing the ins
and outs of EU policy making therefore, the perceived probability for these representatives to
steer EU budget decisions could come out reinforced post-expansion. Moreover, if expansion
towards the east implies larger contributions from net-contributors, even our baseline model
would predict more strategic voting in these countries.
To bring these predictions to the data, we consider the 2004 discontinuity when the EU
moved from 15 to 25 (and then 27 in 2007) countries: the biggest expansion in European
history, which, indeed, took place in the middle of our sample period. Then, we look at
whether our main results change before/after 2004. We report this test in Table 10. We code
a dummy equals 1 after 2004 (Post 2004 ). To facilitate the visualisation of the table, in this
case, we focus on a dummy representing countries in the second tertile (2ndtertile), instead of
two dummies for the first and third tertile. Therefore the base category is represented by both
the first and third tertile. We then create the triple interaction Eurosceptic*2ndtertile*Post
2004, to look at whether our effects change before/after 2004. Indeed, the negative sign of
Eurosceptic*2ndtertile*Post 2004 suggests that our effects are mostly driven by the period
following the EU enlargement.53 Nevertheless, we find a negative effect also in the period
before the enlargement, as shown by Eurosceptic*2ndtertile. Those results provide support for
the idea that voters support even more Eurosceptic representatives after a federal expansion,
53This negative effect is driven by both control groups, i.e. countries in the first and the third tertile (results
available upon request.
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reacting to an increased distance between local and federal preferences.54
Table 10: Eurosceptic Voting at EU vs National Elections: Effects Over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eurosceptic 1.203*** 1.228*** 1.426*** 0.904** 1.466*** 1.489*** 1.755*** 1.231**
(0.401) (0.399) (0.435) (0.442) (0.463) (0.464) (0.514) (0.523)
Post 2004 -0.147 -0.264
(0.331) (0.389)
Eurosceptic*Post 2004 0.917 0.914 0.794 1.222* 1.609** 1.606** 1.520* 1.893**
(0.623) (0.620) (0.653) (0.697) (0.761) (0.760) (0.804) (0.864)
2ndtertile 0.556 0.533
(0.472) (0.474)
2ndtertile*Post 2004 0.206 0.182 -0.0997
(0.655) (0.659) (0.813)
2ndtertile*Eurosceptic -1.325 -1.317 -1.516* -1.544*
(0.871) (0.848) (0.875) (0.925)
Eurosceptic*2ndtertile*Post 2004 -2.079* -2.088* -2.151* -1.886
(1.220) (1.209) (1.253) (1.341)
Diff Turnout -0.0139 -0.0131 0.0144 -0.0142 -0.0132 0.0147
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Cube Law 0.604 0.648 0.671 0.725
(0.958) (0.961) (0.955) (0.957)




Observations 1,128 1,128 1,140 1,140 1,128 1,128 1,140 1,140
R-squared 0.020 0.023 0.041 0.129 0.030 0.033 0.052 0.138
Country FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Time Fe NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-Time FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Note: The Table reports OLS coefficients and Robust Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is DiffEU-Nat (i.e. the difference
in party vote shares between European and National elections); Eurosceptic is a dummy set equal to 1 for Eurosceptic parties; Party Size
is a continuous variable measuring party vote share; Incumbent is a dummy set equal to one for the main incumbent party; Cube Rule
is index of whether the electoral system is proportional/majoritarian; Diff Turnout measures the differences in turnout between national
and European elections. Tertiles split countries in three groups based on their level of net contributions to the EU budget. The omitted
category is the first tertile (largest net contributors). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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